Fault line
As the MNDAA returns a city to the regime, other ethnic armies face a crucial decision that could greatly influence Myanmar’s revolution.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army seems to be standing firm against Chinese pressure to return towns they captured from Myanmar’s military regime.
You might wonder – why would any army give up hard-won territory without firing a shot?
Yet that’s what happened when the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, bowing to Chinese pressure, handed Lashio back to the regime last month.
The same city they fought so fiercely to capture, with considerable help – and blood – from newer resistance groups. All that sacrifice, to hand it back.
Some shrug this off: “That’s the MNDAA – Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese, native to the region, but snug in China’s pocket. A family-run narco-mafia outfit. Of course they weren’t all-in on the revolution.”
That’s cold comfort for the revolutionaries who fought for Lashio – like Brigade 611, a multiethnic force that emerged under MNDAA command in early 2023. Among them is the Bamar People’s Liberation Army, led by well-known poet-turned-fighter Maung Saungkha, dedicated to freeing the country from military rule.

The Trust Deficit
But the relationship between post-coup forces and older ethnic armies is often transactional – newer groups get weapons, experience and training to fight the regime, while ethnic armies gain fighters and public favor to secure their territorial enclaves and, let’s be honest, in some cases, the vested interests of senior commanders.
Every ethnic army has its own language and priorities. What many lack is genuine faith in a “democratic federalist Myanmar” – a concept that desperately needs sharper definition.
For minority communities, restoring any form of Bamar-dominated power threatens to perpetuate the same ethnic animosities and violence they’ve endured for decades. Address that concern properly, and you might see more ethnic armies embracing a nationwide cause. That comes down to trust.
Trust that the MNDAA has now squandered among the resistance. If they had defied China, and held onto Lashio, Beijing would continue to cut off electricity, water, trade and telecoms to their territory. Relations with China, which matter most to them, would be severely damaged.
The junta would likely bomb Lashio and other MNDAA territories relentlessly, as it has done elsewhere. Civilians might direct their anger and despair at the MNDAA.
And who else was suffering as much as the MNDAA – the MNDAA might ask. Yangon? And their leaders might ask, what are we suffering for? Why jeopardize our own little fiefdom for a country we don’t truly believe in? So, they made the decision they did, exposing a fault line that was already apparent in the revolution.
Other currents are pulling ethnic armies away from the nationwide cause – a genuine, no-turning-back struggle for self-determination; others less idealistic: corruption, parochial agendas or a particular susceptibility to Beijing. The MNDAA, after all, has shown us what revolution with Chinese characteristics looks like.
Their Lashio surrender reminded me of the frustration People’s Defence Force fighters felt back in April 2024, when combined forces under the Karen National Union took the key town of Myawaddy, apart from a battered junta battalion hiding by the river.
Maybe the KNU weren’t ready to govern Myawaddy, maybe they didn’t want to confront a junta-aligned Karen splinter group, maybe it was something else. But when they handed the town back to the military and its allies, it left many fighters questioning the bigger picture.
What Serves The Regime
Though the MNDAA may still offer weapons and guidance to resistance groups, they’ve handed the junta a huge military and morale boost. Meanwhile, China – calculating it has more to gain from an enfeebled junta than a liberated Myanmar – is now pressuring other powerful ethnic armies.
Regime leader Min Aung Hlaing then may find it easier to isolate and target post-coup groups, many of which the opposition National Unity Government has failed to unite under central command.
The NUG faces its own critical choices: reform itself from within, implement tactical shifts, or hand over leadership to more experienced hands – different hands. It could accept guidance from a council of expert Myanmar strategists who understand the political and military landscapes.
Or there’s another option: rally PDFs still loyal to NUG command and hurl them at the military in a bid for relevance. Given the NUG leaders’ lack of military acumen, this would be disastrous – first in human lives lost, then in a depth-charge to morale.
Elsewhere, the Arakan Army, PDFs, and Chin forces have gained ground in western Myanmar, while Kachin forces battle regime troops in Bhamo. Yet the military advances in southern Shan State toward Karenni, backed by an emboldened Pa-O National Army.
The junta reportedly has a ground offensive planned for TNLA territory in northern Shan State, and the generals are probably happy with recent clashes between the MNDAA and a non-revolutionary Shan ethnic force. They can always count on two allies to erode their opposition: ethnic grudges and local rivalries.
TNLA: So Far, Defiance
But the TNLA offers hope for the resistance: “We will not give up our territory due to Chinese pressure,” said Colonel Tar Pan La, the group’s joint general secretary, on Sunday (4 May). “We also value the voices of our allies.”
When the regime realized during Beijing-brokered talks that the TNLA wouldn’t fold as easily as the MNDAA, it immediately resumed bombing TNLA-held areas.
I’ve gone on about it, but whether these long-standing ethnic armies embrace the vision of younger revolutionary forces could determine the revolution’s fate. The MNDAA has chosen its path; will the TNLA and others choose differently?
Their Lashio surrender exposed an uncomfortable reality – for some, this revolution burns with urgent necessity; for others, it’s more of a bargaining chip.
For a powerful, raw response to Lashio, I recommend reading this commentary (English translation available via Chrome) in Myanmar Now: https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/63133/
Frontier Myanmar also published a good recap of the Lashio situation via its Political Insider email. Sign up here: https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/membership/
What we’re increasingly hearing are fundamental assertions about Myanmar itself – “Myanmar shouldn’t be a country,” “Chin should join India,” “Rakhine will be independent this year.” I’ll explore one aspect of this soon, and paid subscribers – stay tuned for an upcoming scoop.
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