Myanmar’s resistance: federal, confederal, or just chaos?
A long-term Myanmar analyst shares his unvarnished take on where the resistance is heading.
If you’ve been following Myanmar’s resistance movement, you’ve probably noticed something. There are a lot of acronyms. A lot of committees. A lot of parallel processes that seem to be moving in slightly different directions.
My friend – an analyst, born and raised in Yangon – who’s watched Myanmar’s conflicts for decades, told me: “The country’s becoming a collection of unionless states.”
Given the alternative (endless military dictatorship), that’s not the worst thing. He agreed to expand on the condition of anonymity, which, in the spirit speaking freely on a sensitive topic – as well as some other concerns – I agreed to.
Worth noting: the Myanmar regime still controls significant territory and infrastructure, backed by China and Russia. The revolution is far from over. But my analyst friend focuses here on resistance aspirations.
Here’s what he sent me:
Bottom-Up Federalism or Confederalism?
The resistance talks about “Bottom-Up Federalism”. But federalism implies a power-sharing agreement between the government and the regional state. What appears to be taking shape is more like confederalism, with a very weak central government, and the power residing in the regional entities.
After decades of military rule, the idea is that the central government should be a tiny office that sends friendly requests to a dozen or so regional powers, who may or may not reply, and can opt out of the whole thing.
The roadmap was supposed to be clear: the Federal Democracy Charter would guide everything. But as victory still feels distant, the need for a transitional constitution emerged. That constitution, however, remains stuck in a review committee under the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).
The NUCC was meant to bring together all the resistance’s diverse actors and create consensus decisions – guiding the National Unity Government (NUG), which, with public support, framed itself as Myanmar’s legitimate government after the 2021 coup.
But the NUCC is very dysfunctional, struggles to reach agreements, and key groups are either not part of it, have left it, or distanced themselves from it.
Then came the Articles of Federal Transitional Arrangement (AFTA) – this would, in theory, align all the bottom-up efforts.
Understandably wary of another central power grab, ethnic resistance groups have presented the AFTA as a new transitional constitution, until the one stuck in the NUCC gets implemented. Meanwhile, the State Constitution Coordination Body – a pre-coup project – is somewhere, coordinating something. Probably.
The pathway to Myanmar’s future is now being discussed on three separate platforms: the NUCC, the NUG with the long-standing armed groups of the K2C (Karen, Karenni and Chin — some people say K3C, but the Kachin rarely joined), and various ethnic councils. Each moving forward on different roads in different weather.
Myanmar has always been fragmented, with struggles for ethnic autonomy playing out across its borderlands for decades. The division within opposition politics has been no surprise since the coup. But outside of ethnic struggles, in the broader political conversation, everybody wants to be leader.
That’s the nature of the problem: everybody tries to set up a process or a group where they can be ‘sayagyi’ (master/teacher).
If and when Myanmar is finally liberated, the federal transition may be led by the NUG and the ethnic armies. Or various coordination bodies, advisory councils, transitional committees, and at least three acronyms no one remembers.
Together, or not together, they’ll attempt to draft a constitution while requesting budget approvals from 18 different councils, 12 liberated zones, and six township networks still debating whether they’re provinces, states, regions, or metaphysical concepts.
People speculate that Myanmar will break into several countries. Neighboring countries would never allow that. It’s also not what key groups in Myanmar are pursuing. What’s happening might be a slightly chaotic collection of autonomous states that hopefully somehow works.
Recently, Tay Zar San, a prominent activist who travels around resistance-held areas, wrote what many were thinking: the NUG lacks the leadership skills to win this revolution.
After four years, he argued, it has squandered public support, failed to build an effective military chain of command, failed to rein in groups under its command, and failed to utilize its budget and resources. Many of its ministers and deputy ministers still live abroad.
He quickly drew criticism from NUG lobbyists, but his point stands: if you want success, maybe it’s time to change leadership, strategy, and direction. That could be the next starting point.